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Abstract
A macro-prudential policy maker can manage risks to financial stability only if current
and future risks can be reliably assessed. We propose a novel framework to assess
financial system risk. Using a dynamic factor framework based on state-space meth-
ods, we model latent macro-financial and credit risk components for a large data set
comprising the U.S., the EU-27 area, and the rest of the world. Controlling for global,
region-specific, and industry effects, we construct coincident measures (‘thermometers’)
and forward looking indicators of financial distress and the likelihood of financial melt-
down. We find that credit risk conditions can significantly and persistently de-couple
from macro-financial fundamentals. Such decoupling can serve as an early warning
signal for macro-prudential policy.
Keywords: financial crisis; systemic risk; credit portfolio models; frailty-correlated
defaults; state space methods.
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”One of the greatest challenges ... at this time is to restore financial and economic
stability. ... The academic research community can make a significant contribution in
supporting policy-makers to meet these challenges. It can help to improve analytical
frameworks for the early identification and assessment of systemic risks.” Jean-Claude
Trichet, President of the ECB, Clare Distinguished Lecture in Economics and Public
Policy, University of Cambridge, December 2009.
1 Introduction
Macro-prudential oversight seeks to focus on safeguarding the financial system as a whole.
This has proven to be a major issue in the wake of the recent financial crisis. The debate
on macro-prudential policies and potential warning signals ignited by the crisis is currently
under full swing. Many of the models constructed before the crisis have fallen short in this
respect. For example, regulators have learned the hard way that cross-sectional correlations
between asset and credit exposures can have severe consequences, even though each of these
exposures might be qualified as safe when considered in isolation. Cross-sectional dependence
undermines the benefits of diversification and may lead to a ‘fallacy of composition’ at the
systemic level, see for example Brunnermeier, Crocket, Goodhart, Persaud, and Shin (2009).
In particular, traditional risk-based capital regulation at the individual institution level may
significantly underestimate systemic risk by neglecting the macro impact of a joint reaction
of financial intermediaries to a common shock.
There is widespread agreement that financial systemic risk is characterized by both cross-
sectional and time-related dimensions; see, for example, Hartmann, de Bandt, and Alcalde
(2009). The cross-sectional dimension concerns how risks are correlated across financial in-
stitutions at a given point in time due to, for example, direct and indirect linkages across
institutions and prevailing default conditions. The time series dimension concerns the evolu-
tion of systemic risk over time due to, for example, changes in the default cycle, changes in
financial market conditions, and the potential buildup of financial imbalances such as asset
and credit market bubbles.
In contrast to the broad consensus on the set of models, indicators, and analytical tools for
macroeconomic and monetary policy analysis, such agreement is absent for macro-prudential
policy analysis. The current paper makes a step in filling this gap. In particular, we make
two contributions to the existing literature on systemic risk assessment.
First, we propose a unified econometric framework for the measurement of global macro-
financial and credit risk conditions based on state space methods. The framework follows
the mixed-measurement dynamic factor model (MM-DFM) approach as introduced by Koop-
man, Lucas, and Schwaab (2010). Our model provides a diagnostic tool that tracks the evo-
lution of macro-financial developments and point in time risk conditions, as well as their joint
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impact on system stability. Such a diagnostic tool for systemic risk measurement is definitely
needed as a first step to start assessing and communicating this risk. Second, we develop a
set of coincident and forward looking indicators for financial distress based on the empirical
output of our analysis. We distinguish ‘thermometers’ and ‘crystal balls’. Thermometers
are coincident risk indicators that, metaphorically, a policy maker can plug into the financial
system to read off its ‘heat’. Crystal balls are forward looking early warning indicators that
- to some extent - permit a glimpse into the future of financial stability conditions. Early
warning indicators may be based on estimated deviations from fundamentals that accrue in
the present. Obviously, constructing a useful early warning signal is substantially harder
than an assessment of current risk conditions.
We use our framework to study systemic risk conditions across three broad geographical
regions, i.e., (i) the U.S., (ii) current EU-27 countries, and (iii) all remaining countries. In
this way, our perspective departs substantially from most earlier studies that typically focus
on one region only, in particular the U.S. Several people have stressed the importance of such
an international perspective, see e.g. de Larosiere (2009), and Brunnermeier et al. (2009).
It requires one to look beyond domestic developments for detecting financial stability risk.
In the context of the recent crisis. For example, the saving behavior of Asian countries
has been cited as a contributing factor to low interest rates and easy credit access in the
U.S., see e.g. Brunnermeier (2009). Similarly, developments in the U.S. housing market
have triggered distress for European financial institutions. In our MM-DFM model, we
allow for the differential impact of world business cycle conditions on regional default rates,
unobserved regional risk factors, as well as world-wide industry sector dynamics.
Our empirical study is based on worldwide credit data for more than 12.000 firms. We
differentiate between the impact of macro and financial market conditions on defaults versus
autonomous default dynamics, and industry effects. We refer to the autonomous default
dynamics as frailty effects, see also Duffie, Eckner, Horel, and Saita (2009). Our empir-
ical findings show that the magnitude of frailty effects can serve as a warning signal for
macro-prudential policy makers. Latent residual effects are highest when aggregate de-
fault conditions (the ‘default cycle’) diverge significantly from what is implied by aggregate
macroeconomic conditions (the ‘business cycle’), e.g. due to unobserved shifts in credit sup-
ply. Historically, frailty effects have been pronounced during bad times, such as the savings
and loan crisis in the U.S. leading up to the 1991 recession, or exceptionally good times,
such as the years 2005-07 leading up to the recent financial crisis. In the latter years, default
conditions are much too benign compared to observed macro and financial data. In either
case, a macro-prudential policy maker should be aware of a possible decoupling of system-
atic default risk conditions from their macro-financial fundamentals. The flexible tool of
mixed measurement dynamic factor models provides the necessary sophisticated and flexible
measurement tool needed for a timely detection of this decoupling.
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Our work is related to two lines of literature. First, we relate to the work on accurately
measuring point-in-time credit risk conditions. In general, this is a complicated task since
not all processes that determine corporate default and financial distress are easily observed.
Recent research indicates that readily available macro-financial variables and firm-level in-
formation may not be sufficient to capture the large degree of default clustering present in
corporate default data, see e.g. Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita (2007). In particular, there
is substantial evidence for an additional dynamic unobserved ‘frailty’ risk factor as well as
contagion dynamics, see McNeil and Wendin (2007), Koopman, Lucas, and Monteiro (2008),
Koopman and Lucas (2008), Lando and Nielsen (2008), and Duffie, Eckner, Horel, and Saita
(2009), and Azizpour, Giesecke, and Schwenkler (2010). ‘Frailty’ and contagion risk cause
default dependence above and beyond what is implied by observed covariates alone. Com-
pared to these earlier papers, our current paper takes an explicit international perspective.
In addition, it allows for both macro, frailty, and industry effects. Finally, it provides a
unified framework to integrate systemic risk signals from different sources, whether macroe-
conomic and financial market conditions, equity markets and balance sheet information (via
expected default frequencies, EDFs), or actual defaults.
Another line of literature relates to our second contribution, the construction of systemic
risk measures. Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) adopt a copula perspective to link together
the failure of several financial institutions. Their approach is partly non-parametric, whereas
our framework is parametric. However, our parametric framework lends itself more easily to
extensions to high dimensions, i.e., a large number of individual financial institutions. This
is practically impossible in the Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) approach due to the non-
parametric characteristics. Extensions to higher dimensions is a relevant issue in our current
study, as we take a, literally, global perspective of the financial system. Another paper
related to ours is Giesecke and Kim (2010). These authors take a hazard rate approach
with contagion and observed macro-financial factors (no frailty). In contrast to their model,
our mixed-measurements framework allows us to model the macro developments and default
dynamics in a joint factor structure. Giesecke and Kim, by contrast, take the macro data
as exogenous regressors in their analysis. Also, our study explicitly incorporates the global
dimension and distinguishes between global and regional factors.
The remainder of this paper is set up as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review the liter-
ature on systemic risk measurement and discuss the desirable properties of a good systemic
risk measure. Section 3 discusses our econometric framework that is based on a mixed-
measurement dynamic factor model. Some details of parameter and factor estimation are
given as well. Section 4 presents the data. Sections 5 discusses the main empirical results and
presents coincident and forward-looking measures of financial distress. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Quantitative measures of systemic risk
2.1 A post-crisis literature review
We briefly review a selection of quantitative measures of systemic risk that have recently been
proposed in the literature. In that literature, systemic risk is understood in two different
but related ways. First, the ‘systemic risk contribution’ associated with a large and complex
financial institution corresponds to a negative externality its risk taking has on other firms.
It is the extent to which a firm ‘pollutes the public good’ of financial stability. Given accurate
measures of risk contribution, such an externality may be internalized e.g. through Pigouvian
taxation. Conversely, however, systemic risk is often understood as financial system risk.
We follow this second convention. This notion is analogous to assessing the total size of
the (risk) pie (rather than its composition). It may be operationalized as the time varying
probability of experiencing a systemic event, e.g., the simultaneous failure of a large number
of financial intermediaries.
The literature on financial system risk can be usefully structured by making a distinc-
tion between the different sources of systemic risk. First, financial sector contagion risk is
caused by an initially idiosyncratic problem that sequentially becomes widespread in the
cross-section. Second, shared exposure to financial market shocks and macroeconomic de-
velopments may cause simultaneous problems for financial intermediaries. Third, financial
imbalances such as credit and asset market bubbles that build up gradually over time may
unravel suddenly, with detrimental effects for the system. We review the literature based on
this distinction that is also used in the ECB (2009) report and the lecture of Trichet (2009).
Systemic risk contribution: Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010)
show how each financial institution’s contribution to overall systemic risk can be measured.
The extent to which an institution imposes a negative externality on the system is called
Systemic Expected Shortfall (SES). An institution’s SES increases in its leverage and MES,
Marginal Expected Shortfall. Brownlees and Engle (2010) propose ways to estimate the MES.
Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009, 2010) propose a systemic risk measure called the distress
insurance premium, or DIP, which represents a hypothetical insurance premium against
systemic financial distress. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) suggest CoVaR, the Value at
Risk of the financial system conditional on an individual institution being under stress. These
methods are targeted more towards the identification of systemically important institutions.
Their prime source of information is taken from equity markets via equity return data.
Contagion/Cross-sectional perspective: Contagion risk refers to an initially idiosyn-
cratic problem that becomes more widespread in the cross-section. Segoviano and Goodhart
(2009) define banking stability measures based on an entropy-based copula approach that
matches marginal default probability constraints from CDS markets or other sources. Billo,
Getmansky, Lo, and Pelizzon (2010) capture dependence between intermediaries through
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principal components analysis and predictive causality tests. Some measures allow to infer
systemic risk contribution as well. Similarly, Hartmann, Straetmans, and de Vries (2005)
derive indicators of the severity of banking system risk from banks’ equity returns using
multivariate extreme value theory. This literature recognizes system risk as largely resulting
from multivariate (tail) dependence.
Macro-financial stress: Macroeconomic shocks matter for financial stability because
they tend to affect all firms in an economy. A macro shock causes an increase in correlated
default losses, with detrimental effects on intermediaries and thus financial stability. Aikman
et al. (2009) propose a ‘Risk Assessment Model for Systemic Institutions’ (RAMSI) to assess
the impact of macroeconomic and financial shocks on both individual banks as well as the
banking system. Giesecke and Kim (2010) define systemic risk as the conditional (time-
varying) probability of failure of a large number of financial institutions, based on a dynamic
hazard rate model with macroeconomic covariates. A related study using a large number of
macroeconomic and financial covariates is Koopman, Lucas, and Schwaab (2008).
Financial imbalances: Financial imbalances such as credit and asset market bubbles
may build up gradually over time. However, they may unravel quite suddenly and abruptly
with detrimental effects on financial markets and intermediaries. Financial imbalances are
not easily characterized and difficult to quantify. Inference on financial misalignments can be
based on observed covariates, such as the private-credit-to-GDP ratio, total-lending-growth,
valuation ratios, changes in property and asset prices, financial system leverage and capital
adequacy, etc., see e.g. Borio and Lowe (2002), Misina and Tkacz (2008), and Barrell, Davis,
Karim, and Liadze (2010). Despite recent progress, these models still display large errors
when predicting financial stress.
2.2 What is needed for measuring systemic risk ?
We identify five core features for an appropriate indicator of systemic risk. We refer to these
features in the next sections where we discuss our econometric framework.
A broader definition of systemic risk: Current tools for financial risk measurement
rely on relatively narrow definitions of a systemic event. A more comprehensive framework
could be based on e.g. the theoretical work of Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2006)
who argue that systemic risk arises from (i) spillover dynamics at the financial industry level,
(ii) shocks to the macroeconomic and financial markets environment, and implicitly (iii) the
potential unraveling of widespread financial imbalances. These sources of risk act on observed
data simultaneously, and should therefore all be part of a diagnostic framework. Otherwise,
incorrect risk attributions may arise. For example, allowing for interconnectedness through
business links but not for shared exposure to common risk factors may spuriously attribute
dependence to links that do not exist.
International or inter-regional focus: Several studies have stressed the importance
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of an international perspective, see e.g. Brunnermeier et al. (2009), de Larosiere (2009) and
Volcker et al. (2009). As argued in the introduction, an exclusive focus on domestic con-
ditions is inefficient at best and most likely severely misleading. Consequently, a diagnostic
tool for systemic risk should incorporate information from various regions and industries.
Macroeconomic/financial conditions: The main source of risk in the banking book
is default clustering. Adverse changes in macroeconomic and financial conditions affect
the solvency of all, financial and non-financial, firms in the economy. Observed macro-
financial risk factors are therefore systematic and a source of cross-sectional dependence
between defaults. The resulting default clusters have a first-order impact on intermediaries’
profitability and solvency, and therefore on financial stability. As a result, proxies for time-
varying macro-financial and credit risk conditions should be at the core of a systemic risk
assessment exercise.
Expected default frequencies: Financial institutions rarely default. This is partic-
ularly the case in Europe, where we count 12 financial defaults in the period from 1984Q1
to 2010Q2. Data scarcity poses obvious problems for the modeling of shared financial dis-
tress and financial default dependence. As a consequence, models based on actual default
experience may only give a partial picture of current stress. Other measures of credit risk
can complement historical default information. Such information can be obtained from asset
markets (equities, bonds, credit default swaps) and possibly be augmented with accounting
data. One candidate that integrates information from accounting data (via debt levels) and
forward-looking equity markets (via prices and volatilities) are expected default frequencies
(EDF) which are based on structural models for credit risk. We include this measure in
our empirical analysis. Other information can be added in the form of credit default swaps
(CDS) spreads. However, the short length of time series of liquid CDS for individual firms
is typically a problem.
Unobserved factors: Financial distress, systemic risk, and the time-varying probabil-
ity of a systemic event are inherently unobserved processes. Their main drivers are also
unobserved: contagion risk at the financial sector level, changes in shared macro-financial
conditions, and financial imbalances such as unobserved large shifts in credit supply. Many
of these unobserved conditions, however, can be inferred (reverse-engineered) from different
sets of observed data. The appropriate econometric tools for extracting unobserved factors
from observed data are collectively known as state space methods.
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3 The diagnostic framework
3.1 Mixed-measurement dynamic factor models
We use the mixed-measurement dynamic factor model (MM-DFM) approach as introduced
in Koopman, Lucas, and Schwaab (2010). The approach is based on a state space framework
and incorporates all desired features as stated in Section 2.2. The main idea is to estimate
the composite factors of unobserved systemic risk using a panel of time series observations.
Once the unobserved (or latent) risk factors are estimated, we can construct an accurate
coincident and forward looking measures of systemic risk.
Credit risk is the main risk in the banking book and time-varying credit conditions are
therefore central to systemic risk assessment. Our data sources for assessing credit risk
consist of N macroeconomic and financial market variables xt, default counts yt obtained
from historical information across R regions, and expected default frequencies (EDFs) zt for
Sr financial firms in the rth region for r = 1, . . . , R and for time index t = 1, . . . , T . The
data is denoted by
xt = (x1t, . . . , xNt)
′ , (1)
yt = (y1,1t, . . . , y1,Jt, . . . , yR,1t, . . . , yR,Jt)
′ , (2)
zt = (z1,1t, . . . , z1,S1,t, . . . , zR,1t, . . . , zR,SR,t)
′ , (3)
for t = 1, . . . , T , where xnt represents the value of the nth macroeconomic variable at time
period t, yr,jt is the number of defaults for economic region r, cross-section j and time period
t, and zr,st is the EDF in economic region r of financial s in time period t, for n = 1, . . . , N ,
t = 1, . . . , T , r = 1, . . . , R, j = 1, . . . , J and s = 1, . . . , Sr. Cross-section j can represent
different categories of firms. For example, j can represent industry sector, rating category,
firm age cohort, or a combination of these. We assume that all variables xt, yt, and zt are
driven by a vector of common dynamic factors, that is ft. However, our panel data may be
unbalanced, such that all variables may not be observed at all time periods.
The model combines normally and non-normally distributed variables. We adopt a stan-
dard conditional independence assumption: conditional on latent factors ft, the measure-
ments (xt, yt, zt) are independent over time and within the cross-section. In our specific case
and conditional on ft, we assume that the elements of xt are normally distributed with their
means as functions of ft. The default counts yr,jt have a binomial distribution with kr,jt
trials and with a probability πr,jt that is a function of ft. The number of trials kr,jt refers
to the number of firms and πr,jt is the probability of default for a specific cross-section j in
region r at time t. The EDFs zt are transformed to represent a frequency for a quarterly
horizon. The corresponding log-odds ratio is defined as z̄r,st = log (zr,st/(1− zr,st)). We
effectively model the log-odds as being a normal variable (conditional on ft). The factor
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structure distinguishes macro, regional frailty, and industry-specific effects, denoted by fmt ,
fdt , f
i








t ). The latent factors are the main
input for our systemic risk measures which we discuss below.
In the factor model structure we assume that the macroeconomic and financial variables
in xt are only determined by the macro factors while the other observed variables in yt and








yr,jt|fmt , fdt , f it ∼ Binomial (kr,jt, πr,jt) , (5)







where the means µnt and µ̄st, and probability πr,jt are functions of ft and where the variances
σ2n and σ̄
2
s are treated as unknown coefficients. The number of firms at risk kr,jt is known
since it is observed from the dataset. The factors in fmt capture shared business cycle
dynamics in both macro and credit risk data, and are therefore common to xt, yt, and z̄t.
The frailty factors in fdt are region-specific; they only load on the realized defaults, yr,t,
and the log-odds of EDFs, z̄s,t, from a given region. The frailty and industry factors are
independent of observed macroeconomic and financial data. They capture variation due
to default risk, above and beyond what is already implied by the macro factors fmt . The
latent factors in f it affect firms in the same industry. Such factors may arise as a result
of default dependence through up- and downstream business links, and may capture the
industry-specific propagation of aggregate shocks. Both fdt and f
i
t help capture a deviation
of default activity from what is implied by macro-financial fundamentals as summarized by
fmt .
The point-in-time default probabilities πr,jt in (5) vary over time due to the shared
exposure to the underlying risk factors in xt, as summarized by f
m
t , to the frailty effects f
d
t ,







where θr,jt may be interpreted as the log-odds or logit transform of πr,jt. This transform
ensures that time-varying probabilities πr,jt are in the unit interval.
The panel data dynamics in (1) to (3) are captured by time-varying parameters or un-
observed signals which are modeled as functions of the dynamic factors in ft. In particular,
we have
































where λr,j, cn, and c̄r,s are fixed effects, and risk factor sensitivities β, γ, and δ refer to the
loadings on macro factors, frailty factors, and industry-specific factors, respectively. Fixed
effects and factor loadings may differ across firms and regions. Since the cross-section is high-
dimensional, we follow Koopman and Lucas (2008) in reducing the number of parameters
by imposing the following additive structure,
χ̄r,j = χ0 + χ1,dj + χ2,sj + χ3,rj , for χ̄ = λ, β, γ, δ, β̄, γ̄, δ̄ (11)
where χ0 represents the baseline effect, χ1,d is the industry-specific deviation, χ2,s is the
deviation related to rating group, and χ3,r is the deviation related to regional effects. Since
we assume that the baseline effect χ0 is nonzero, some of the other coefficients need to be
subject to zero constraints to ensure identification. The specification in (11) is parsimonious
yet sufficiently flexible to accommodate heterogeneity across regions and industries.








. We assume that the
elements of ft follow independent autoregressive dynamics. In our study, we have
ft = Φft−1 + ηt, ηt ∼ NID (0, Ση) . (12)
where the coefficient matrix Φ and covariance matrix Ση are assumed diagonal. Extensions to
more complex dynamic structures are straightforward exercises. The autoregressive structure
in (12), however, already allows sufficient stickiness in the components of ft. For example,
it allows the macroeconomic factors fmt to evolve slowly over time and to capture business
cycle dynamics in macro and default data. Similarly, the credit climate and industry default
conditions are modeled as persistent processes for fdt and f
i
t , respectively. The m× 1 distur-
bance vector ηt is serially uncorrelated. To ensure the identification of the factor loadings,
we impose Ση = I − ΦΦ′. It implies that E[ft] = 0, Var[ft] = I, and Cov[ft, ft−h] = Φh, for
h = 1, 2, . . .. As a result, the loading coefficients βr,j, γr,j, and δr,j in (9) can be interpreted
as risk factor volatilities (standard deviations) for the firms in cross section (r, j). It also
leads us to the initial condition f1 ∼ N(0, Σ0) and completes the specification of the factor
process.
3.2 Parameter and risk factor estimation
The mixed measurement dynamic factor model presented in the previous section is an ex-
tension of the non-Gaussian measurement state space models as discussed in Shephard and
Pitt (1997) and Durbin and Koopman (1997) to modeling observations from different fam-
ilies of parametric distributions. The model relies on a parameter vector that contains the
coefficients in Φ, λ, β, γ, δ, β̄, γ̄, and δ̄. This parameter vector is estimated by the method of
simulated maximum likelihood. Since our dynamic factor model partly relies on the binomial
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density, the likelihood function is not available in a convenient analytical form. We therefore
need to evaluate the high-dimensional integral of the likelihood function directly. Numerical
integration is not computationally feasible for such high-dimensional cases and therefore we
rely on Monte Carlo simulation methods for evaluating the likelihood function. As the same
random numbers can be used for likelihood evaluations for different parameter vectors, the
likelihood is a smooth function of the parameter vector. Hence we can maximimize the
Monte Carlo likelihood function directly by means of a numerical optimization method. We
refer to the Appendix A1 for details on our simulation based estimation procedure for mixed
measurement data.
An advantage of using state space methods is the convenient treatment of missing values
in the dataset. Missing values can have a strong presence in the panels (1) to (3). For
example, some macroeconomic variables in xt may not be available at the beginning of the
sample. Also, default data yr,jt is not available (missing) if there are no corresponding firms
at risk, that is kr,jt = 0. We refer to the Appendix A2 for the treatment of the many missing
values in our setup. Clearly, state space methods provide a natural framework to account
for missing entries in the data without any adjustments to the model.
The cross-sectional dimension in the panels (1) to (3) can become very large. High-
dimensional measurements can lead to computational problems for any method of estima-
tion. Jungbacker and Koopman (2008) show that state space methods for dynamic factor
models with high-dimensional measurements and a low-dimensional state vector become
computationally feasible when we transform the panel dataset to a time series of observation
vectors that have the same dimension as the factors. The transformation results are only
justified for the linear Gaussian measurement model. However, many importance sampling
computations as detailed in Appendix A1 rely on an approximating linear Gaussian mea-
surement equation. Appendix A3 demonstrates that we can adapt the results of Jungbacker
and Koopman (2008) to nonlinear models for partly non-Gaussian data. These methods are
helpful regarding the feasibility of the analyses in our empirical study.
3.3 Thermometers and crystal balls
Using the mixed measurement model set-up, we can construct indicators of financial distress
for a specific region or combination of regions. Being based on (8) to (10), such indicators
automatically integrate the effects of macro, frailty, and industry effects. We consider five
indicators, four coincident measures (‘thermometers’), and one forward-looking early warning
indicator (‘crystal ball’). Thermometers are designed to display the current ‘heat’ in the
financial system. A crystal ball is an early warning indicator that captures imbalances
that are currently building up and may pose a risk to the system at a later stage. Both
thermometers and crystal balls are essential tools to monitor system risk in a forward looking
macro-prudential policy context.
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The first thermometer is the model-implied financial sector failure rate. The time-varying
default probability πr,jt in (7) can be interpreted as the fraction of financial intermediaries
that are expected to fail over the next three months. We estimate this quantity by aggre-
gating implied rates from the bottom up across banks and financial non-banks. Naturally,
high failure rates imply high levels of common financial distress, and thus a higher risk of
adverse real economy effects through financial failure.
A second thermometer is the time-varying probability of simultaneous failure of a large
number of financial intermediaries, as suggested in Giesecke and Kim (2010). Such inter-
mediaries may be depository institutions, but also insurers, re-insurers, and broker/dealers
that provide intermediation services. The latter three categories are part of the ‘shadow’
banking system. Due to the conditional independence assumption, the joint probability of
failure can easily be constructed from the binomial cumulative distribution function and the
time-varying financial sector failure rates.
A third indicator is based on the default signals θr,jt in (9). The signals θr,jt consist














, where the fixed effects λr,j pin down
the through-the-cycle log-odds of the default rate, and the systematic factors fmt , f
d
t , and f
i
t
jointly determine the point-in-time default conditions. The signals θr,jt are Gaussian since all
risk factors in ft are Gaussian. We can therefore standardize these signals to unconditionally
standard normally distributed values zθr,jt,
zθr,jt = (θr,jt − λr,j) /
√
Var(θr,jt),






r,jδr,j ≥ 0 is the unconditional variance of θr,jt. Our






where Φ̄(z) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Values of SRIr,jt lie
between 0 and 1 by construction with uniform (unconditional) probability. Values below
0.5 indicate less-than-average common default stress, while values above this value suggest
above-average stress. Values below 20%, say, are exceptionally benign, and values above
80% are indicative of substantial systematic stress. Our measure of financial system risk is
obtained when (13) is applied to model-implied failure rates for financial firms in a given
region.
A fourth indicator of financial system risk is the expected number of financial defaults
over the next year conditional of at least one financial default occurring,
BSIr,j = kr,jtπr,jt/ (1− Binomial (0; kr,jt, πr,jt)) . (14)
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This Banking Stability Index has been proposed by Huang (1992), and subsequently used by
e.g. Hartmann et al. (2005) and Segoviano and Goodhart (2009). Naturally, a high expected
number of financial defaults indicates adverse financial conditions.
Finally, the indicator (13) can be modified to only capture frailty and industry effects.
This yields a signal whether local default experience in a particular industry and region is
unexpectedly different from what would be expected based on macro fundamentals fmt . This
indicator is our ‘credit risk bubble’ early warning indicator,





Section 5 below reports and discusses the indicator values from this section. In particular,
we demonstrate that major deviations of credit risk conditions from what is implied by stan-
dard macro-financial fundamentals have in the past preceded financial and macroeconomic
distress.
4 Data
We use data from three main sources in the empirical study below. First, a panel of macroe-
conomic and financial time series data is taken from Datastream with the aim to capture
international business cycle and financial market conditions. Macroeconomic data is ob-
tained for different economic regions, including the U.S. and the EU-27 countries. Table 1
provides a listing. The macro variables enter the analysis as annual growth rates from
1984Q1 to 2010Q1.
A second dataset is constructed from default data from Moody’s. The database contains
rating transition histories and default dates for all rated firms (worldwide) from 1984Q1
to 2010Q1. From this data, we construct quarterly values for yr,jt and kr,jt in (5). When
counting exposures kr,jt and corresponding defaults yr,jt, a previous rating withdrawal is
ignored if it is followed by a later default. If there are multiple defaults per firm, we consider
only the first event. In addition, defaults that are due to a parent-subsidiary relationship
are excluded. Such defaults typically share the same default date, resolution date, and legal
bankruptcy date in the database. Inspection of the default history (text) and parent number
confirms the exclusion of these cases. The database distinguishes 12 industry sectors which
we pool into seven industry groups, see the first column of Table 2 for a listing. We consider
four broad rating groups, investment grade Aaa−Baa, and three speculative grade groups
Ba, B, and Caa− C.
Table 2 provides an overview of the international exposure and default count data. Cor-
porate data is most abundant for the U.S., with E.U. countries second. Most firms are either
from the industrial or financial sector. The bottom of Table 2 suggests that about 60% of
12
Table 1: International macroeconomic time series data
We list the variables contained in the macroeconomic panel. The time series data enters the analysis as
yearly (yoy) growth rates. The sample is from 1984Q1 to 2010Q1.
Region Summary of time series in category Total no
(i) U.S. Real GDP
Industrial Production Index
Inflation (implicit GDP price deflator)
Dow Jones Industrials Share Price Index
Unemployment Rate, 16 years and older
US Treasury Bond Yield, 20 years
US T-Bill Yield, 3 months
ISM Purchasing Managers Index
8
(ii) EU-27 Euro Area (EA16) Real GDP
Euro Area (EA16) Industrial Production Index
Euro Area (EA16) Inflation (Harmonized CPP)
Euro Share Price Index, Datastream
Euro Area (EA16) Unemployment Rate
Euro Area (EA16) Gov’t Bond Yield, 10 years
Euro Interbank Offered Rate (Euribor), 3 months
Euro Area (EA16) Industrial Confidence Indicator
8
(iii) Other Japan: Real GDP
Japan: Unemployment Rate
Japan: Tokyo Stock Exchange Index (Topix)
China: Real GDP











Table 2: International default and exposure counts
The top panel presents default counts disaggregated across industry sectors and economic region. The middle
panel presents the total number of firms counted from 1981Q1 to 2010Q1. The bottom panel presents the
cross section of firms at risk (‘exposures’) at point-in-time 2008Q1 according to rating group and economic
region.
Defaults U.S. Europe Asia Remainder Sum
Bank 41 8 9 13 71
Fin non-Bank 84 4 8 6 102
Transport 90 17 1 7 115
Media 127 2 0 2 131
Leisure 97 9 1 14 121
Utilities 24 2 0 5 31
Energy 79 0 1 6 86
Industrial 435 16 16 37 504
Technology 177 38 3 21 239
Retail 94 1 2 2 99
Cons Goods 120 8 3 14 145
Misc 31 0 4 12 47
Sum 1399 105 48 139 1691
Firms U.S. Europe Asia Remainder Sum
Bank 478 603 238 353 1672
Fin non-Bank 966 371 130 370 1837
Transport 336 70 29 43 478
Media 460 33 5 29 527
Leisure 434 73 5 54 566
Utilities 597 149 41 97 884
Energy 512 84 31 121 748
Industrial 1920 419 180 317 2836
Technology 941 204 86 134 1365
Retail 311 32 21 25 389
Cons Goods 591 110 34 78 813
Misc 250 151 66 192 659
Sum 7796 2299 866 1813 12774
Firms, 2008Q1 U.S. Europe Asia Remainder Sum
Aaa 50 84 26 43 203
Aa 141 355 85 165 746
A 415 403 161 176 1155
Baa 575 229 91 200 1095
Ba 278 72 51 126 527
B 673 96 62 121 952
Ca-C 379 58 7 49 493
Sum 2511 1297 483 880 5171
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Figure 1: Actual default experience
We present time series plots of (a) the total default counts
∑
j yr,jt aggregated to a univariate series, (b) the
total number of firms
∑





time. We distinguish different economic regions: the U.S., the EU-27 area, and other countries.
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all worldwide ratings are investment grade. European and Asian firms are more likely to be
rated investment grade, with shares of 83% and 75%, respectively. Figure 1 plots aggregate
default counts, exposures, and observed fractions over time for each economic region.
Table 2 reveals that financial intermediaries rarely default, in particular in Europe. This is
an obvious problem for inference on time-varying risk conditions. For financials, we therefore
add data from a third dataset. Data on expected default frequencies for the 20 largest
(based on 2008Q4 market cap) financial firms in the US, EU-27, and Rest of the World,
is taken from Moody’s KMV CreditEdge. These 3 × 20 = 60 expected default frequencies
are based on a firm value model that takes equity values and balance sheet information as
inputs. We use it to augment our relatively sparse data on actual defaults for financial firms.
Figure 2 plots the panel of EDF data, after transformation to a quarterly scale and log-odds
ratio. The principal components and reported eigenvalues in the bottom panel indicate
substantial common variation across institutions and regions that can be summarized in a
factor structure.
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Figure 2: Expected default frequencies of 60 global financials
The top panel reports the standardized log-odds from EDF data for the largest 60 global financial firms
(banks and financial non-banks). The sample consists of the largest 20 U.S., EU-27, and Rest of the world
financial firms, respectively. The raw data sample is from 1990Q1 to 2010Q3, and contains missing values.
Missing values are inferred using the EM algorithm of Stock and Watson (2002). The bottom graph plots



























First PC from 20 largest US financial EDFs, 63.3% explained variation 
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5 Empirical results on system risk
This section presents the main empirical findings. Section 5.1 comments briefly on the main
sources of financial default clustering. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 present our thermometers and
crystal balls for systemic risk assessment.
5.1 Why do financial defaults cluster?
Observed credit risk data reveals that aggregate financial sector failure rates are up to ten
times higher in bad times than in good times. This is striking. Why do financial failures
cluster so dramatically over time? Which sources of risk are important, and to what extent?
The answer to these questions is important for constructing effective coincident and forward
looking risk indicators.
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for model specification (1) to (12). The fixed
effects and factor loadings in the signal equation (9) satisfy the additive structure (11).
Coefficients λ in the left column combine to the baseline failure rates. The middle and right-
hand columns present estimates for loadings β, γ, and δ that pertain to macro, frailty, and
industry factors, respectively.
The parameter estimates indicate that macro, frailty, and industry effects are all impor-
tant for international credit risk conditions. Defaults from all regions and industries load
significantly on common factors from global macro-financial data. This by itself already im-
plies a considerable degree of default clustering. In general, however, common variation with
macro data is not sufficient. Frailty effects are pronounced in particular for U.S. firms. The
industry-specific factors load significantly on default data from all regions, which indicates
shared dynamics across regions.
Table 4 attributes the variation in the (Gaussian) log-odds of financial sector failure
rates to three primary risk drivers, i.e., changes in macro-financial conditions, excess default
clustering for all firms (financial and non-financial), and financial sector-specific dynamics.
These drivers are associated with the vectors of latent factors fmt , f
d
t , and f
i
t , respectively.
The relative importance of each source of variation can be inferred from the estimated risk
factor loadings. Given that each risk factor is unconditional standard normal, the factor
loading is the estimated risk factor volatility (standard deviation) by construction.
Table 4 indicates that shocks to joint macro-financial and default conditions are the
dominant driver of financial distress. Times of financial sector stress and business cycle
downturns have tended to coincide. This is intuitive, since financial stress may have negative
real consequences, and vice versa, with significant feedback and amplification effects. Timing
effects are only captured indirectly, as current estimates of fmt capture a rotated version of
current and lagged structural driving forces, see Stock and Watson (2002) for a discussion
and intuition from the linear Gaussian context. Industry and frailty dynamics are important
17
Table 3: Parameter estimates
We report the maximum likelihood estimates of selected coefficients in the specification of the log-odds ratio
(9) with parameterization (11) for λ and β. Coefficients λ combine to fixed effects, or baseline failure rates.
Factor loadings β, γ, and δ refer to macro, frailty, and industry risk factors, respectively. The estimation
sample is from 1984Q1 to 2010Q1.

















































Table 4: Why do financial defaults cluster?
We report the results of a variance decomposition of transformed (Gaussian, log-odds) failure rates for
financial firms in three economic regions. The unconditional variation is attributed to three latent sources of
financial distress. Each source of distress is captured by a corresponding set of latent factors and associated















r,jδr,j ≥ 0, and j refers to financial firms. The










U.S. 67.9% 19.0% 13.1%
EU-27 51.5% 0.2% 48.3%
Rest of world 69.5% 15.1% 15.4%
secondary sources of joint financial failure. As a result, all three sources of risk should
all be accounted for. In particular, an exclusive focus on contagion linkages in a network
(e.g. through ‘heat maps’ and ‘spider web’ plots) without properly taking into account the
dependence due to common risk factors will likely yield a wrong attribution of cross-sectional
dependence to links that do not exist.
5.2 Thermometers: coincident indicators of financial distress
This section presents the thermometers that are constructed from the estimated risk factors
and loading parameters. Figure 3 plots the estimated quarterly financial sector failure rate.
This rate is obtained by aggregating from the bottom up across individual banks and financial
non-banks. For U.S. financials, the values range from slightly above zero in good times to
more than 1% in crisis times. This means that about 4-5% of the currently active financial
intermediaries are expected to default over the course of one year. Shaded areas in Figure
3 represent U.S. recession periods according to the NBER. Each recession implies common
(systematic) stress on financials. The 1991 and 2008-09 recessions have been harder on
U.S. financials than the relatively more benign 2001 recession. We also find that a recession
is not necessary for systemic stress of financial firms. An example is the period in the late
1980s in the U.S., when common stress is pronounced while the economy is not in recession.
Model-implied stress for European and Rest of the world intermediaries is lower than for
U.S. financials. This is due to their higher credit quality on average, see Table 2.
Figure 4 plots the time-varying probability of at least k banking failures, k = 1, . . . , 20.
This joint probability is based on 1000 assumed exposures, and plotted over time 1984Q1
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Figure 3: Implied financial sector failure rate
We plot the model-implied default failure rate for financial sector firms. The sector failure rate is obtained
by aggregating across banks and financial non-banks from the bottom up. Shaded areas represent NBER
US recession times. Estimation sample is 1984Q1 to 2010Q1.
Financial sector hazard rate, US EU−27 Rest of world 
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Figure 4: Probability of simultaneous financial failures
We report the probability of a systemic event, defined as the simultaneous failure of k or more rated financial
firms. Financial firms are banks and financial non-banks. The threshold k can be read off the y-axis.
Exposures are held fixed at 1000, such that k = 10 implies a quarterly failure rate of 1% or more. The left




















































Figure 5: Banking Stability Index
We plot indicator (14), i.e., the expected number of financial defaults over a one year horizon conditional on
at least one default occurring. Firms at risk are held fixed at 100. Shaded areas correspond to US NBER
recession periods. Financial firms are banks and financial non-banks.













to 2010Q4. In general, the model-implied likelihood of losing more than 1% (i.e., 10) of
financial firms over the next three months is negligible during most times. However, this
probability can be substantial during times of crisis. The estimated failure probabilities are
at best coincident indicators. For example, the model-implied risk of financial meltdown is
at a minimum as of mid-2007, at the begin of the financial crisis, despite the use of market
data and forward looking EDFs to assess system risk. It underscores the point that the
financial system may be most at risk exactly when it in fact looks the safest. This is referred
to as the ‘paradox of systemic risk’, see Borio (2010).
Figure 5 plots the expected number of financial defaults over a one year horizon given
that at least one firm is going down over that time period, see (14). We hold the number of
exposures fixed at 100. During the peak of the financial crisis, about five U.S. financials are
expected to fail over the next year conditional on one firm going down. No data on financial
sector counterparty exposures is used for this estimate. This is an advantage, since such
data will likely take years to be available.1
Figure 6 plots financial distress based on the indicator (13). The probability integral
transformation in (13) maps common financial distress into a uniform variable, such that
its percentiles can be read off the transformed y-axis. We refer to the best and worst 20%
of times as relative ‘exuberance’ and ‘crisis’, respectively. Financial distress is virtually
absent during the mid/late-1990s and mid-2000s. The mid-1990s are associated with the
Clinton-Greenspan policy mix of low interest rates and low budget deficits, and corresponding
1The newly founded U.S. Office of Financial Research (OFR) is mandated to make an important step
in this regard, and has a strong backing through the Dodd Frank act. The OFR sets data standards and
has legal subpoena power to obtain information from financial institutions. As of now and the near future,
however, counterparty exposures are simply not observed.
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Figure 6: Scaled financial distress
The figure plots the risk indicator (13) based on the model-implied financial sector failure rates. A percentile-
to-percentile transformation implies that relative levels of implied distress can be read off the y-axis. The
best and worst 20% of times are referred to as times of exuberance and crisis, respectively.
Financial distress, US EU−27 Rest of world 





favorable macroeconomic conditions. The mid-2000s are characterized by exceptionally low
interest rates and easy credit access for U.S. firms. We note that bubbles started to build
during either of these times (the dot.com and lending bubble, respectively). The role of
a macro-prudential policy maker is then to consider taking away the punch bowl from the
‘party’ once it starts to heat up. Conversely, support measures may be required during times
of crisis. The indicator (13) helps in making assessments of relative historical, current, and
(possibly) predicted future stress.
5.3 Early warning signals
We argue that large frailty effects at a given time can serve as a warning signal for a macro-
prudential policy maker. Roughly speaking, frailty effects capture the difference between
current point-in-time default conditions vis-a-vis their benchmark values based on observable
macro-financial covariates. Such differences can arise due to e.g. unobserved shifts in credit
supply, changes in (soft) lending standards, and financial imbalances that are difficult to
quantify. The main idea is that a comparison of credit and macro-financial conditions yields
a useful early warning indicator for financial stability. It can be seen as related to the
private credit to GDP ratio, which is in line with the relevant early warning literature, see
for example Borio and Lowe (2002), Misina and Tkacz (2008), Alessi and Detken (2009),
and Barrell, Davis, Karim, and Liadze (2010). The main difference is that we look at credit
risk instead of credit quantity relative to macro-financial conditions.
Past experiences of financial fragility, financial booms and financial crises, suggests that
problems rarely appear at the same place in the financial system twice in a row. The
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main commonality between the different events that turned into a fully fledged financial
crisis is that they were not expected by market participants and regulators. Goodhart and
Persaud (2008) point out that if market prices for assets or credit were good at predicting
crashes, crises would not happen. Similarly, Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) explain how
asset market bubbles can build up over time despite the presence of rational arbitrageurs.
Mispricing can persist in particular during late stages of an asset or lending bubble. These
findings suggest that (i) building early warning signals based solely based on market prices
has obvious drawbacks, and that (ii) it may be useful to look for structure in the ‘unexpected’,
or leftover variation.
Our warning signals build on Koopman, Lucas, and Schwaab (2008), Duffie, Eckner,
Horel, and Saita (2009), and Azizpour, Giesecke, and Schwenkler (2010) who find substantial
evidence for a dynamic unobserved risk factor driving default for U.S. firms above and beyond
what is implied by observed macro-financial covariates and other information. We interpret
the frailty factor as largely capturing unobserved variation in credit supply, or changes in
the ease of credit access. We rely on two pieces of evidence for interpretation, as reported in
Koopman, Lucas, and Schwaab (2008). First, frailty tends to load more heavily on financially
weaker - and thus more credit constrained - firms. This appears to hold in general, and in
particular during the years leading up to the financial crisis. Second, our frailty estimates are
highly correlated with ex post reported lending standards, such as the ones obtained from the
Senior Loan Officer Survey (SLO), as e.g. reported in Maddaloni and Peydro (2010). These
findings suggests that frailty, among other effects, captures outward shifts in (unobserved)
credit supply. Changes in the ease of credit access affect credit risk conditions: it is hard to
default if one is drowning in credit. As a result, systematic default risk (‘the default cycle’)
can decouple from what is implied by macro-financial conditions (‘the business cycle’).
The left panel of Figure 7 presents the estimated frailty factors for the U.S., EU-27, and
the rest of the world, scaled by their standard deviations. For the U.S., frailty effects have
been pronounced during bad times, such as the savings and loan crisis in the U.S. in the late
1980s, leading up to the 1991 recession. They have also been pronounced in exceptionally
good times, such as the years 2005-07 leading up to the recent financial crisis. In these years,
default conditions are much more benign than would be expected from observed macro and
financial data. At these times, frailty effects are large in absolute value, and significantly
different from zero.
Our ‘credit risk bubble’ indicator (15) combines estimated frailty and financial sector
industry effects into an early warning signal. By construction, the indicator is the absolute
value of a standard normal variable. As a result, values above 1.96 can be seen as extreme,
and values around 3 are very extreme. Shaded areas correspond to NBER recession times.
Focusing on the U.S., deviations from macro-financial fundamentals are high during the
1986-91 savings and loan crisis, which contributed to the later 1991 recession. U.S. risk
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Figure 7: Latent factor estimates
The left panel reports the conditional mean estimates of three region-specific frailty factors. The right panel
plots the financial sector industry factor that is common to financial firms in all regions. The approximate
standard error bands in the right panel are at a 95% confidence level.
Financial sector industry factor, all regions 
0.95 std error band 
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Figure 8: ‘Credit risk bubble’ early warning indicator
We plot deviations of credit risk conditions (here for financial firms) from macro-financial fundamentals as
captured by the indicator (15). Shaded areas correspond to NBER US recession periods. The indicator is
constructed as the absolute value of a standard normal variable. Values above 1.96 are ‘exceptional’. The
horizontal line is at 2.
‘Credit risk bubble’ early warning indicator, US 
EU−27 
Rest of world 




US S&L crisis during 1986−91 Dot com bubble burst in March 2000 and ensuing 2001 recession
Financial crisis of 2007−09
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indicator values are again elevated leading up to the March 2000 dot.com asset bubble burst
and the ensuing 2001 recession. Finally, during the years leading up to the financial crisis,
risk conditions have visibly completely decoupled from macro-financial fundamentals. We
conclude that a monitoring of time-varying credit risk and macro-fundamental conditions is
of key importance for making macro-prudential policy. Our mixed-measurement dynamic
factor model is a versatile tool to make financial stability assessments operational.
6 Conclusion
We proposed a novel diagnostic framework for financial systemic risk assessment based on
mixed-measurement dynamic factor models and state space methods. We found a large
degree of commonality in the default climate for large corporate firms across the globe. This
holds in particular for financial firms, underlining the global nature of systemic stress events.
We combined the factor estimates into new and straightforward indicators of coincident and
future financial system risk, and found that a decoupling of credit from macro-financial
conditions may serve as an early warning signal for a macro-prudential policy maker.
Appendix A1: estimation via importance sampling
The observation density function of y = (y′1, x
′





′ can be expressed by the joint density of y and
f = (f ′1, . . . , f
′
T )
′ where f is integrated out, that is
p(y; ψ) =
∫
p(y, f ;ψ)df =
∫
p(y|f ; ψ)p(f ; ψ)df, (A.16)
where p(y|f ; ψ) is the density of y conditional on f and p(f ; ψ) is the density of f . Importance sampling
refers to the Monte Carlo estimation of p(y;ψ) by sampling f from a Gaussian importance density g(f |y;ψ).




g(f |y;ψ) g(f |y; ψ)df = g(y; ψ)
∫
p(y|f ; ψ)
g(y|f ; ψ)g(f |y;ψ)df. (A.17)
Since f is from a Gaussian density, we have g(f ;ψ) = p(f ; ψ) and g(y; ψ) = g(y, f ; ψ) / g(f |y; ψ). In case
g(f |y;ψ) is close to p(f |y; ψ) and in case simulation from g(f |y; ψ) is feasible, the Monte Carlo estimator




g(y|f (k); ψ) , f
(k) ∼ g(f |y;ψ), (A.18)
is numerically efficient, see Kloek and van Dijk (1978), Geweke (1989) and Durbin and Koopman (2001).
For a practical implementation, the importance density g(f |y; ψ) can be based on the linear Gaussian
approximating model
yjt = µjt + θjt + εjt, εjt ∼ N(0, σ2jt), (A.19)
where mean correction µjt and variance σ2jt are determined in such a way that g(f |y; ψ) is sufficiently close
to p(f |y; ψ). It is argued by Shephard and Pitt (1997) and Durbin and Koopman (1997) that µjt and σjt
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can be uniquely chosen such that the modes of p(f |y;ψ) and g(f |y;ψ) with respect to f are equal, for a
given value of ψ.
To simulate values from the importance density g(f |y; ψ), the simulation smoothing method of Durbin
and Koopman (2002) can be applied to the approximating model (A.19). For a set of M draws of g(f |y;ψ),
the evaluation of (A.18) relies on the computation of p(y|f ;ψ), g(y|f ; ψ) and g(y; ψ). Density p(y|f ; ψ) is
based on (5) and (4), density g(y|f ; ψ) is based on the Gaussian density for yjt − µjt − θjt ∼ N(0, σ2jt), that
is (A.19), and g(y;ψ) can be computed by the Kalman filter applied to (A.19), see Durbin and Koopman
(2001).
The likelihood function can be evaluated for any value of ψ. By keeping the random numbers fixed, we
maximize the likelihood estimator (A.18) with respect to ψ by a numerical optimisation method. Further-
more, we can estimate the latent factors ft via importance sampling. It can be shown that
E(f |y; ψ) =
∫
f · p(f |y; ψ)df =
∫
f · w(y, f ; ψ)g(f |y; ψ)df∫
w(y, f ; ψ)g(f |y; ψ)df ,
where w(y, f ; ψ) = p(y|f ; ψ)/g(y|f ; ψ). The estimation of f̃t = E(f |y; ψ) and its standard error st via





















with wk = p(y|f (k); ψ)/g(y|f (k); ψ), f (k) ∼ g(f |y; ψ), and f̃t is the tth element of f̃ .
Appendix A2: treatment of missing values
When missing values are present in the data vector y = (y′1, . . . , y
′
T )
′, some care must be taken when
computing the importance sample weights wk = p(y|f (k); ψ)/g(y|f (k); ψ), f (k) ∼ g(f |y; ψ). The mode
estimates of the corresponding signals θ = (θ′1, . . . , θ
′
T )
′ and factors f = (f ′1, . . . , f
′
T )
′ are available even when
we have missings. Some bookkeeping is required to evaluate p(y|f ; ψ) and g(ỹ|f ;ψ) at the corresponding
values of f , or θ. Forecasts f̃T+h, for h = 1, 2, . . . ,H, can be obtained by treating future observations
yT+1, . . . , yt+H as missing, and by applying the estimation and signal extraction techniques of Section 6 to
data (y0, . . . , yT+H).
Appendix A3: collapsing observations
A recent result in Jungbacker and Koopman (2008) states that it is possible to collapse a [N × 1] vector of
(Gaussian) observations yt into a vector of transformed observations ylt of lower dimension m < N without
compromising the information required to estimate factors ft via the Kalman Filter and Smoother. We
here adapt their argument to a nonlinear mixed-measurement setting. We focus on collapsing the artificial
Gaussian data ỹt with associated covariance matrices H̃t, see (A.19) and (12).
Consider a linear approximating model for transformed data ỹ∗t = Atỹt, for a sequence of invertible



















]′. We require (i) matrices At to be
of full rank to prevent the loss of information in each rotation, (ii) Aht H̃tA
l′
t = 0 to ensure that observations
ỹlt and ỹht are independent, and (iii) Aht Zt = 0 to ensure that yht does not depend on f . Several such matrices
Alt that fulfill these conditions can be found. A convenient choice is presented below. Matrices A
h
t can be
constructed from Alt, but are not necessary for computing smoothed signal and factor estimates.
































t , θt = Zft, and Z contains the factor loadings. Clearly, the [N −m]
dimensional vector ỹht contains no information about ft. We can speed up computations involving the KFS
recursions as follows.
Algorithm : Consider (approximating) Gaussian data ỹt with time-varying covariance matrices H̃t, and
N > m. To compute smoothed factors ft and signals θt,
1. construct, at each time t = 1, . . . , T , a matrix Alt = CtZ




and Ct upper triangular. Collapse observations as ỹlt = Altỹt.
2. apply the Kalman Filter and Smoother (KFS) to the [m × 1] low-dimensional vector ỹlt with time-
varying factor loadings C−1′t and H̃ lt = Im.
This approach gives the same factor and signal estimates as when the KFS recursions are applied to the
[N × 1] dimensional system for ỹt with factor loadings Z and covariances H̃t.
A derivation is provided in Jungbacker and Koopman (2008, Illustration 4).
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